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I N THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET, I N C . , 
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STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 14263 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Evidence presented to the Tax Commission shows 
t h a t a l l automobiles are purchased by Mer r i l l Bean 
Chevrolet , I n c . , for r e s a l e , and t h a t from the stock 
of automobiles thus purchased, the taxpayer a r b i t r a r -
i l y p icks c o l o r s , models, and automobiles wi th c e r t a i n 
opt ion equipment for demonstration purposes, and t h a t 
a t a l l times and under a l l circumstances t he automobiles 
are a t the dea l e r sh ip for sa le t o an u l t ima te consumer 
unless they a r e then being demonstrated (T. P .52, L. 19-25)• 
These unassigned demonstrators are designated " loaners" 
to d i s t i n g u i s h them from demonstrators assigned t o s a l e s -
men. However, they are c l a s s i f i e d by General Motors Corpor-
a t ion as demonstrators (T. P.72, L.2-24) and a re used 
p r imar i ly for demonstrator purposes (T. p . 7 1 , L.1-13) . 
On occasion they are "loaned" to another salesman who 
has sold h i s demonstrator (T. P.64, L. 19-25), and on 
occasion they are "loaned" to a customer whose o lder 
model car i s in for r e p a i r , in an e f f o r t t o ge t the 
customer to d r ive a new automobile and make a comparison 
with h i s o ld one on which he i s facing a r epa i r b i l l , 
a l eg i t imate s a l e s technique (T. P.6 5, L. 21-24). 
1 
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Merr i l l Bean Chevrolet , I n c . , does not general ly 
enjoy the luxury of having a sa les force su f f i c i en t 
in s ize t o allow a salesman t o be assigned to every 
model of car t h a t should be in demonstration; conse-
quent ly , there are models in demonstration t h a t are 
not assigned to salesmen (T. P. 64, L. 11 ,12) . 
Furthermore, the salesmen w i l l genera l ly choose t o 
demonstrate automobiles in the medium pr i ce range 
which have the f a s t e s t turnover because they are 
paid on commission and can more r e a d i l y s e l l such 
a demonstrator. Most salesmen cannot afford to 
operate the higher priced automobiles, such as a 
Caprice s t a t i o n wagon, and yet such automobiles 
must be ava i l ab l e for demonstration purposes 
(T. P.80, L .9-25) . 
The ownership of these " loaners" or unassigned 
demonstrators i s represented by a manufacturer fs 
C e r t i f i c a t e of Origin t h a t i s held by the financing 
i n s t i t u t i o n u n t i l t he car i s taken a t random out of 
new car inventory and spec i a l ly t i t l e d by the 
Sta te of Utah for demonstration purposes (T. P.86, 
L. 7-24). I n t e r e s t on the loan increases one-half 
percent for c a r s in demonstration (T. P . 5 1 , L .4-18) . 
2 
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The vehicle Is retired from service as a demon-
strator (T. P.83, L.19-25) under rules and regula-
tions of General Motors Corporation before 6,0 00 miles 
to preserve the new car warranty and the demonstrator 
status of the automobile (T. P.67, L.2-25). Under 
federal tax rules the automobiles may not be depreci-
ated because of demonstrator use (T. P*8 3, L.19-25), 
and when the demonstrators are sold to the ultimate 
consumer they are shown on the contract to be new 
cars that have been in demonstration (T. P.76, L.l-6, 
P,83, L. 11-16}, and the State of Utah titles them 
as new cars and at that time receives a sales tax 
on the retail sale (T. P*84, L,2-6). It is evident 
that these vehicles may be sold to the ultimate con-
sumer immediately after being placed in demonstration, 
or they nay be sold as much as six months later (T« 
Pe66, L.22-25). 
POINT 1 
ALL NEW CARS PURCHASED BY MERRILL BEAN 
CHEVROLET, INC., FROM GENERAL MOTORS ARE 
FOR RESALE * 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet is a "retailer" as defined 
in §59-15-2, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. The business of 
the corporation is to sell new and used automobiles 
3 : ... . 
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to an ultimate consumer, and all of their cars are 
for resale. 
The term "sale" is defined at 5 9-15-2, U.C.A. 
1953, as amended, and among other things, 
...includes installment and credit sales, 
every closed transaction constituting a 
sale... 
...an even exchange of tangible personal 
property shall not be deemed a sale for 
purposes of this act, but in any trans-
action wherein tangible personal property 
is taken as part of the sales price of 
other tangible personal property, the 
balance valued in money or other consider-
ation shall be deemed a sale. 
The words "use" and "purchase" are defined at . 
59-16-2, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
Cb) The word "use" means the exercise of any 
right or power over tangible personal property 
incident to the ownership of that property, 
except that it shall not include the sale, 
display, demonstration, or trial of that 
property in the regular course of business and 
held for resale, (emphasis added) 
(c) The word "purchase" means any transfer, ex-
change or barter, conditional or otherwise, in 
any itanner or by any means whatsoever, of 
, tangible personal property for a cash con-
sideration, whether paid with order, on open 
account, or by installments. A transaction 
whereby the possession of property is trans-
ferred but the seller retains the title as 
security for the payment of the price shall 
be deemed a purchase, (emphasis added) 
4 
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The Commission takes the position that these 
vehicles are being consumed or used and that a use 
tax is therefore assessable the very minute they 
are placed in demonstration. However, they completely 
ignore the definition of the word "use" as set forth 
in §59-16-2, U.CA. 1953, as amendedr and the fact 
that use tax cannot apply to the "sale, display, 
demonstration, or trial of that property (demonstrators) 
in the regular course of business and held for resale". 
The record clearly shows that these automobiles are 
principally used for demonstration purposes and are 
at the dealership daily for that purpose, and in 
paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact the Commission 
states that they are only occasionally loaned to 
salesmen who have sold their demonstrator automo-
biles pending receipt of a new car demonstrator for 
said salesmen. Also, these automobiles are occasion-
ally loaned to a potential customer who is having his 
car serviced, and some of these loaner-demonstrators 
are sold to potential customers on this basis. The 
evidence is therefore unequivocal that these unassigned 
demonstrators are excepted from taxation under Chapter 
5 
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16, T i t l e 59, U.C.A., and the testimony of Mr. Bosch 
a t page 24 beginning a t l i n e 15 confirms t h i s approach: 
Q. Now are they being taxed because t h e y ' r e 
used for loan purposes, or are they 
being taxed because t h e y ' r e unassigned 
demonstrators? 
A. Bas ica l ly because they are used for 
loan purposes. We have no object ion 
to demonstrators being unassigned 
necessa r i ly as such. 
Then a t Page 28 of the t r a n s c r i p t , Mr. Bosch makes 
the following admission beginning a t l i n e 16: 
Q. You indicated to us previously t h a t 
on unassigned demonstrators, i f they 
are used pr imar i ly for demonstration 
purposes and only occasional ly a s 
l oane r s , there would be no t ax due. 
A. Right, we concede t h a t . 
POINT I I 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT 
THE ASSESSMENT OF THE SALES TAX ON THE AUTO-
MOBILE DRIVEN BY MRS. BEAN. 
The Commission found as a fact under paragraph 16 
that a sales tax deficiency was assessed against 
the automobile used by Mrs. Bean and classified by 
the dealership as a demonstrator. If a sales tax 
was assessed, it must be based on a sale, and inas-
much as Merrill Bean Chevrolet cannot make a sale 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to itself (T. P. 17, L. 14-19) the sales tax has to be 
on the theory that Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc., as 
a corporation, sold a vehicle to Merrill Bean or to 
his wife, Janet Bean. If such a sale took place, then 
paragraph 15 of the Findings of Fact has no application 
because the seller is not General Motors Corporation, 
but rather, Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc., and the trade 
we are concerned about is not between Merrill Bean 
Chevrolet and General Motors but rather between Merrill 
Bean as an individual and Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc., 
and paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact further supports 
this view because the Commission found that the Internal 
Revenue Service requires that the corporation charge 
Merrill Bean for the use of Mrs. Bean's automobile 
as compensation from the corporation to Merrill Bean 
(T. P.91, L.8, 9). In other words, he pays for the 
car. 
The record shows that Mrs. Bean, drives as many as 
five different vehicles in one year (T. P*84, Lc 24,25), 
and these vehicles are traded back to the dealership by 
Mr. Bean without any cash consideration. The record is 
entirely devoid of any suggestion that the dealership 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
receives a cash consideration when the trade is-made, 
and the entire transaction falls squarely within the 
provisions of 59-15-2(b), wherein it is stated: 
••.An even exchange of tangible personal 
property shall not be deemed a sale for 
purposes of this act, but in any trans-
action wherein tangible personal 
property is taken as part of the sales 
price of other tangible personal property, 
the balance valued in money or other con-
sideration shall be deemed a sale. 
In a letter addressed to the Utah State Tax Commission 
dated October 24, 1974, the taxpayer's attorney stated 
unequivocally that the reason for the refusal to pay 
tax on Mrs. Bean's car is that the vehicle is traded 
back to Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc., straight across 
for another vehicle without cash exchange. This is the 
theory that was pursued by the taxpayer throughout the 
hearing, and the record is completely devoid of any 
evidence to the contrary. The fact that Merrill Bean 
Chevrolet, in compliance with the auditing procedures 
of General Motors, chooses to treat this car as a demon-
strator, and in fact does demonstrate the vehicle (T. 
P.72-73), does not thereby take it out of the category 
of a trade of tangible personal property which in fact 
is exactly what happens. 
The Tax Commission has chosen to interpret Rule 
8 
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S-8 2 in such a manner as to fail completely to give 
any validity to the sections of the Utah Code cited 
as applying directly to the two issues before the 
court. The Auditing Division of the Tax Commission 
frankly concedes that a literal interpretation of 
S-82 would have extremely harsh results in the case 
of an automobile dealer whose wife may drive four or 
more different automobiles in one year with the pros-
pect that any automobile she drives may be sold out 
from under her by the dealership without notice 
(T. P.13, L.5~15). At Page 31 of the transcript, be-
ginning at line 6, the testimony illustrates the 
problems of Rule S-82 as presently being applied by 
the Tax Commission: 
Q. And then when the car is resold by Merrill 
Bean, when the demonstrator is resold by 
Merrill Beanf a full sales tax is assessed 
on the price paid by the ultimate consumer, 
is that correct? 
A. Mer r i l l Bean's customer i s requi red to pay 
the sa l e s t ax r yes s i r , if i t r e s u l t s in 
a taxable sale* 
Q. And the d i f ference between those per iods of 
t ime, t h a t could be as shor t a s 12 hours and 
as much as four months. 
A. T h a t ' s co r r ec t , t h a t ' s p r i n c i p a l l y where we 
j u s t assessed the tax on one car a year . 
9 
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Q. Well, i f your theory holds t r u e , though, you 
are r e a l l y not following the law, are you, 
Mr. Bosch? 
A. No, a s far as our theory holds t r u e , we should 
have assessed more tax on more veh ic l e s . 
Q, That i s what I mean, don ' t you have t o assess 
i t on a l l the cars t h a t Mrs. Bean dr ives? 
A. Well, I don ' t know tha t we have t o . "I guess 
following the law, we would probably subs t i t u t e 
our judgment for the law. 
Q. And when you say following the law, you r e a l l y 
mean following the Regulation S.82, d o n ' t you? 
A. Which in our opinion i s in conformity with the 
law, or i t cou ldn ' t have been adopted and 
promulgated. 
As a taxpayer , p l a i n t i f f has a deep d i s t r u s t of having 
the Auditing Division subs t i t u t e i t s judgment for the 
law, because no one knows i f the same judgment in sub-
s t i t u t i o n of t he law being exercised in t h i s t axpayer ' s 
case i s a lso being exercised in the audi t of o ther au to -
mobile dea l e r s in l i k e circumstances, and the taxpayer 
was summarily prevented from making inqui ry . The witness 
t e s t i f i e d a t page 41 of the record, beginning a t l i ne 
Q. Did you review an aud i t involving Duaine 
Brown Chevrole t ' s l a s t audi t? 
A. If the re was an aud i t , I would have reviewed 
i t . 
10 
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MR. DEAMER: Mr. Chairman, again I wish to 
object on the basis of relevancy. I 
don't see the relevance of an audit 
conducted on Duaine Brown Chevrolet 
in the matter of Merrill Bean Chevrolet 
sales tax deficiency. 
CHAIRMAN HOLMAN: The objection is sustained. 
MR. BEAN: I think. I can show the relevancy 
if I may be allowed to proceed just 
briefly, and then if I don't the chair-
man can make an order to strike it from 
the record. 
CHAIRMAN HOLMAN: No, I think we will just 
sustain the objection. 
Q* (by Mr. Bean) Well, let me ask the 
question this way, Mr. Bosch, are you 
representing to us that the same audit 
procedures and charges were made cigainst 
Duaine Brown Chevrolet that are now 
being assessed against Merrill Bean 
Chevrolet? 
MR. DEAMER: Again I wish to object, Mr. 
Chairman. I donft see the relevance 
of how tax audits are conducted among 
many dealers as to the application of 
the sales tax deficiency against one 
dealer. 
CHAIRMAN HOLMAN: Sustained. 
We further have difficulty with the gratuitous 
statement by the witness for the Tax Commission to the 
effect that Rule S-82 is in conformity with the law or 
it couldnft have been adopted and promulgated. As was 
said in Olsen Construction Co., et al., v. State Tax 
Commission of Utah, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (19 61), 
11 
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a t page 1113: 
Nor does the quoted provision of sa les tax 
regula t ion No. 58 aid the p l a i n t i f f s . The 
commission has since dele ted t h i s provision 
from i t s r e g u l a t i o n s , and now contends, with 
some embarrassment, t h a t i t had no lega l 
b a s i s and was contrary to law. We agree with 
t h i s content ion. The regula t ion went beyond 
permiss ib le l im i t s of adminis t ra t ive i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n , s ince i t would, on the. f a c t s of 
t h i s case , nu l l i fy the appl icable s t a t u t o r y 
d e f i n i t i o n s of the terms " r e t a i l s a l e " and 
" r e t a i l e r " and would grant an exemption 
where the s t a t u t e s grant none. This c o u r t , 
while recognizing the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t one 
might be penalized by r e l i ance upon an i n -
v a l i d adminis t ra t ive regu la t ion , has held 
t h a t an adminis t ra t ive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n out 
of harmony and contrary to the express p ro -
v i s ions of a s t a t u t e cannot be given weight 
and, to do so, would in e f f ec t amend t h a t 
s t a t u t e . 
The s t r a ined i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the Tax Commission puts 
on t h e i r Rule S-82 cannot be used to emasculate the 
de f in i t i on of "sa le" of 59-16-2 (b) and Cc), and of course 
when the Tax Commission begins to s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment 
under i t s own regu la t ion , the r e s u l t s are horrendous* 
For example, Mr. Bosch s t a t e s t h a t they tax only one 
car per year t o Mrs. Bean, with the implicat ion tha t 
they do t h i s to soften the harsh e f f ec t s of t h e i r own 
r u l e , but where the. record shows without con t rad ic t ion 
t h a t Mrs. Bean's car i s traded by Mr. Bean for another 
new car under the provisions of the statute, their tax 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
can only apply to the cash difference, and the Tax Com-
mission must first ascertain what that cash difference 
is before they can assess any tax. In substituting 
their judgment for the law, the Tax Commission simply 
says, in effect-—It is difficult for us to determine 
what the casfi difference was because there is no record 
of a cash difference, and therefore we will simply tax 
one car per year as a fair compromise* But there is no 
statutory or legal justification for any tax at all on 
the vehicles traded by Mr, Bean when he has once paid 
a full tax on the purchase price of one vehicle in 19 71 
immediately after S-82 became effective* The record, 
at Page 35, beginning at line 3, shows some uncertainty 
on the part of the Tax Commission on this issue. 
Q. Now what prevents Merrill Bean Chevrolet 
from trading that car back to General 
Motors as vendor and having Merrill Bean 
take another vehicle as vendee? 
A. Nothing would prevent it if General 
Motors is willing to do it, 
Qc And if they did that it would be a non-
taxable transaction if no money changed 
hands. Is that correct? 
A. Well, we had some discussion on that. 
I am not really sure if it would be non-
taxable or not, to tell you the truth. 
13 
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It is readily admitted by the Tax Commission 
that they have no authority to determine the sales 
price of vehicles sold by Merrill Bean Chevrolet 
(T. P.46, L.17-21). Furthermore, it is a well known 
fact that in the retail sales of new automobiles the 
suggested retail sales price or window sticker price 
is seldom if ever the actual price to the consumer, 
and that the price of automobiles will vary because 
of a number of factors, including supply and demand, 
season of the year, engineering improvements, U.S. 
Government regulations on seat belts, pollution de-
vices, and other safety equipment, and the proposed 
increase in price in next year's models. Therefore, 
the amount of sales tax collected by the State of Utah 
on each new unit is affected far more by the factors 
mentioned, than the fact that the vehicle may have 
been used as a demonstrator or loaned occasionally. 
The fact of the matter is, that a Tax Commission auditor 
has strong personal feelings about automobile dealers 
whose wives drive an automobile where no sales tax is 
paid when his wife has to pay a sales tax on the car she 
drives, and it was this same auditor who helped design, 
14 
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implement, and interpret Rule S-32 (T. P.14-15). 
I t i s a f a c t t h a t a l l b u s i n e s s e s and a l l p r o f e s s i o n s 
h a v e b u i l t - i n b e n e f i t s : The m e d i c a l d o c t o r s e l d o m 
s e n d s a b i l l t o h i s c o l l e a g u e f o r m e d i c a l s e r v i c e s 
r e n d e r e d t o members o f h i s f a m i l y . The l a w y e r se ldom 
b i l l s h i s p a r t n e r f o r s e r v i c e s r e n d e r e d t o him o r 
members o f h i s f a m i l y . The t a x a u d i t o r se ldom b i l l s 
h i s d a u g h t e r o r h e r h u s b a n d f o r f e d e r a l a n d s t a t e 
income t a x r e t u r n s . And t h e c o r p o r a t e a u t o m o b i l e 
d e a l e r i s a b l e t o t r a d e c a r s u s e d b y members of h i s 
f a m i l y back i n t o t h e c o r p o r a t i o n w i t h o u t p a y i n g a c a s h 
d i f f e r e n c e t h a t i s t a x a b l e . 
POINT I I I 
TIE USE TAX ASSESSED ON UNASSIGNED DEMONSTRATORS, 
AND THE SALES TAX ASSESSED ON VEHICLES DRIVEN BY 
MRS. BEAN, CONSTITUTES DOUBLE TAXATION AND IS 
CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE EXPRESSED 
INTENT OP THE LEGISLATURE IN PROVIDING FOR. SALES 
AND USE TAXES. 
I n p r o v i d i n g f o r s p e c i a l t i t l e s f o r d e m o n s t r a t o r 
a u t o m o b i l e s f t h e Motor V e h i c l e D i v i s i o n of t h e S t a t e Tax 
Commission h a s a l r e a d y t a k e n t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t a demon-
s t r a t o r a u t o m o b i l e i s i n t h e c a t e g o r y o f t a n g i b l e p e r s o n a l 
p r o p e r t y u s e d f o r trdisplay, demonstration, or tr ial 
. . . in the regular course of business and held for 
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resale11 • The Commission found as a fact that the 
federal government will not permit said automobiles 
to be depreciated by the dealer, and the manufacturer 
of said automobiles, General Motors Corporation, per-
mits the use of said automobiles in the way that they 
are being used by the taxpayer without concern for 
depreciation of value and has designed accounting pro-
cedures for its dealerships to allow such use without 
sale and with full new car warranty at the time of sale 
to the ultimate consumer. All who deal with these 
automobiles understand and accept the demonstrator 
category except the Tax Commission, who now, contrary 
to the expressed intent of their only witness, insist 
that tax applies if the vehicle is occasionally loaned 
to a salesman. The transfer of cars used in demonstra-
tion from the new car account to a demonstrator account 
consistent with the auditing practices of General Motors 
Corporation does not thereby constitute a purchase of 
said automobiles for the use and benefit of the taxpayer. 
At that point in time the cars have already been 
financed by GMAC. General Motors has already been paid, 
and GMAC holds the manufacturers Certificate of Origin, 
which is the only title then in existence for said auto-
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mobile, as security for payment by Merrill Bean 
"Chevrolet. In construing the meaning of 59-16-3, U.C.A. 
195 3 as amended, the court in Utah Concrete Products 
Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 10.1 Utah 513, 125 P. 2d 
408 (1942), at page 412 said: 
The definitiion of "purchase" thus includes 
a "transfer, exchange or barter" for a 
consideration. The mere bookkeeping and 
physical transfer of the use of one's 
own products not only does not come within 
the clear meaning contemplated by the 
legislature of "transfer, exchange or 
barter", but is also lacking in consider-
ation. The mere charge on the books of 
the plaintiff for the materials they used 
for themselves is for purposes of keeping 
inventory correct and cannot be termed a 
"transfer" in the sense as used by the 
legislature,... 
In Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
101 Utah 135, 17 0 P.2d 164 (1946), the court was called 
upon to consider the purposes for which the use tax was 
levied, and in expressing the public policy of this state 
the court said, at page 168: 
Plaintiff would have subsection (a) of 
the use tax act next above quoted exempt 
from the use tax any class or type of 
property the sale of which was subject 
to the sales tax of this state at the 
tine the use tax law was passed regard-
less of whether or not the sales tax law 
was later amended to exempt that proper-
ty from the sales tax. We do not inter-
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p r e t the subsection tha t way. Subsection 
(aI was enacted to prevent the sa,les t ax 
and the use tax from being chargeable on the 
same a r t i c l e s of personal proper ty; t h a t i s , t o 
prevent the use tax from being applied to the 
use, s torage or consumption of spec i f ic a r t i c l e s 
of personal proper ty , the gross r ece ip t s from the 
s a l e of which'Vere subject t o the sa l e s "tax. 
(emphasis added! 
In fur ther expounding on the public po l i cy and the 
i n t e n t of the l e g i s l a t u r e the court said, a t page 169: 
The c l e a r i n t e n t of the l e g i s l a t u r e in passing 
subsection (dl was t o prevent dupl ica t ion of 
t axes and discr iminat ion aga ins t proper ty which 
was a l ready subject t o a tax comparable t o the 
use t a x . The subsection in e f f ec t says: If a 
s a l e s o r excise t ax i s charged by any s t a t e of 
the Union aga ins t the gross r e c e i p t s from the 
s a l e , d i s t r i b u t i o n or use of t ang ib l e personal 
proper ty , the s torage, use , or o ther consumption 
of t h a t specif ic property in Utah i s exempted 
from the Utah s t a t e use t a x . 
In fur ther expounding on sa les tax theory, the cour t 
sa id , a t page 171: 
. . .Under the o r ig ina l ac t a l l of the purchases of 
the manufacturer, i f for the use of h i s bus iness , 
were exempt from payment of the sa les t a x . Pur-
chases of a r t i c l e s which were used or consumed 
and which did not go in to the a r t i c l e s manufactured 
were not t axab le . This was not in harmony with 
the sa les tax theory t h a t while the t ax should not 
be exacted more than once, i t should be paid 
a t l e a s t once; hence the amendment, which 
exempted from payment of t he tax any a r t i c l e , 
substance or commodity which en te r s i n to and 
becomes an ingredient or component pa r t of the 
product manufactured or compounded. 
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It thus becomes apparent that use tax is com-
plementary to and in lieu of sales tax and was not de-
signed or contemplated to be a tax in addition to sales 
tax on the same article• In Chicago Bridge and Iron 
Cov vs. Johnson, 19 C.2d 162, 119 P.2d 945 (19391 the 
California Supreme Court stated at page 947: 
*,.The use tax act is complemental to the 
California Retail Sales Act of 1933. The 
latter levies a tax on the gross receipts 
of California retailers from sales of 
tangible personal property; the former im-
poses an excise on the consumer at the same 
rate for the storage, use or other consump-
tion in the state of such, property when 
purchased from any retailer. As property 
covered by the sales tax is exempt under 
the use tax, all tangible personalty sold 
or utilized in California is taxed once for 
the support of the state government. 
I n L
* A. Young Sons Construction Co. v. State Tax 
Commission of Utak, 23 Utah 2d 84, 457 P.2d 973 (1969), 
the court stated that if a purchase of tangible personal 
property was exempt under the sales tax act, it is also 
exempt under the use tax act, regardless of the fact that 
the property was purchased outside the state. Here the 
automobiles purchased from General Motors are exempt from 
sales tax because the automobiles are destined for resale 
to an ultiitate consumer. The fact that those automobiles 
are demonstrated in the course of business does not change 
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the charac ter of the o r ig ina l acqu i s i t ion by Mer r i l l 
Bean Chevrolet from General Motors Corporation. The 
fac t t h a t said automobiles are designated a s " loaners" 
because they are not assigned to a salesman and are 
therefore occas ional ly loaned does not change the fac t 
t h a t they are used pr imari ly for demonstration and 
t r i a l . Other s t a t e s have attempted to impose a use t ax 
on a i rp lane d e a l e r s (Montgomery Aviation Corp. v. S t a t e , 
275 Ala. 266, 154 So*2d 2 4, heavy equipment d e a l e r s , 
iferman M. Brown Co. v . Johnson/ e t a l . , 82 N.W,2d 134, 
Iowa (1957J and have been refused by the cour t s , and 
we now ask t h i s honorable court to r e j e c t the double t a x -
a t ion attempted by the Sta te Tax Commission and declare 
Rule S~82 adopted by sa id Commission t o be cont rary to 
the s t a t u t e s of t h i s s t a t e . 
Respectfully submitted t h i s 15th day of November, 
1975. 
DAVID E. BEAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. 
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A P P E N D I X 
S82e Demonstration, d isp lay and t r i a l (Applies 
to sa l e s and use taxes)0—Tangible personal proper ty 
purchased by a wholesaler or a r e t a i l e r and held for 
d i sp l ay , demonstration or t r i a l in the regular course of 
h i s bus iness i s not subject t o t ax . An example of t h i s 
i s a desk bought by an o f f i ce supply firm and placed in 
a window d i sp lay . Another example of t h i s i s an au to -
mobile purchased by an auto dea le r and assigned t o a 
salesman a s a demonstrator* Sales t ax app l i e s t o any 
r e n t a l charges t h a t might be made t o the salesman for 
use of a demonstrator. Sales t ax app l ies to these 
charges even though a l l or pa r t of the charge may be 
waived i f such waiver i s dependent upon the salesman 
performing c e r t a i n serv ices or reaching a c e r t a i n sa l e s 
quota or some s imi la r contingencye Also, t ax app l ies 
t o items purchased pr imar i ly for company or personal 
use and only casua l ly used for demonstration purposes. 
For example9 wreckers, or service t rucks used by a p a r t s 
department, would be subject t o t ax even though they 
a re demonstrated occas iona l ly . Also, automobiles assigned 
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to non sa l e s personnel such as a service manager, an 
of f ice manager, an accountant, an o f f i c e r f s wife or 
a lawyer would be subject to tax even though they may 
be demonstrated on occasion. 
Normally, veh ic les wi l l not be allowed as demonstra-
t o r s i f they are used well beyond the new model year by a 
new car dea l e r or i f used for more than s ix months or so 
by a used car dea l e r . Tax wi l l apply i f these condit ions 
are not met unless i t i s shown t h a t these guidel ines are 
inappl icab le in a given ins tance , in which case cons ider-
a t ion w i l l be given t o the circumstances surrounding the 
need for a demonstrator for a longer period of t ime. 
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